Fast. Precise. Intelligent.a reconnaissance engine for authorized engagements
The attack engine that stops where the proof stops.
nice_scan plans reconnaissance and exploitation actions, chains confirmed findings into deeper probes, and reports what actually happened. Every result is classified on execution: verified probes earned it on the wire, observed labels a signal the target itself showed, hypothesis is a chain deliberately not counted.
$ nice_scan hack example.com --timeout 15s -R report.html
◈ NICE HACKER — 14 actions queued · 2 gated
01s ▸ Recon + crawl OBSERVED
04s !! SQL injection 142 records extracted VERIFIED
07s !! Local file inclusion 12 files captured VERIFIED
10s ◈ CORS → XSS chain HYPOTHESIS
12s ✓ Risk 9.5 / 10 hypotheses weighted 0
✓ report.html — evidence separated by verdict
- 165
- fingerprints
- 14
- attack actions
- 2
- held behind
--destructive - 10
- chain patterns
- 0
- claims without evidence
Action inventory
What the engine runs when it reaches a target. Two rows are consent-gated:
command injection and web-shell upload never fire without --destructive.
Recon
- Passive reconcrt.sh and Wayback feeds mapped before the first packet touches the target
- Crawlbreadth-first discovery of pages, forms and script files, same-origin only — plus route literals harvested from first-party JS bundles
- Fuzzknown paths and parameter sets probed; 404-baseline aware so soft-404 noise stays out — OpenAPI specs and JS-declared routes widen the surface
- Port scanconcurrent sweep across the host's interface addresses
Probes — detection
- XSScanary-tagged reflection; a claim needs an executable context the baseline cannot echo
- SQL injectionboolean-differential and time oracle gated 2-of-2; errors confirmed against a neutral round
- Local file inclusionstructural file records diffed against a no-payload baseline, then read for content
- GraphQLintrospection and field exposure checked against the schema the endpoint reveals
- S3 bucketscandidate enumeration and readable-bucket confirmation, evidence above name collisions
Exploitation & signals
- Login brutedifferential verdict against a junk-credential baseline — the page lying about success is filtered out
- JWT forge
alg=noneand common-secret signing; access requires more than an accepted token shape - OOB callbacksblind SSRF/SSTI/XSS sink with a reachability verdict — an unreachable sink says so instead of promising
Consent-gated do not fire without --destructive
- Command injectionquoted-marker probe;
uid=output from a real execution — nothing else — releases the verdict - Web shell uploadupload accepted is reported as medium; a deployed shell is claimed only when its marked probe executes
The verdict system
The report's structure forces honesty: findings can only be filed by execution. Signals and untested chains are recorded, but they never inflate the risk score.
Install
Fail-closed: the installer resolves one tag, verifies SHA256 and the pinned GPG key, and aborts with nothing installed when any check refuses.
# Linux / macOS — fail-closed installer
curl -sfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NICE-DEV226/nice-Scan/main/scripts/install.sh | sh
# Windows — PowerShell 7+
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NICE-DEV226/nice-Scan/main/scripts/install.ps1 -OutFile install.ps1
powershell -ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned -File install.ps1
# Pinned tag — no @latest, no main HEAD
go install github.com/NICE-DEV226/nice-Scan/cmd/nice_scan@v0.3.7
Air-gapped? Ship the release archive + checksums.txt (+ .sig) on any media, then
install.sh --archive nice_scan_<ver>_linux_amd64.tar.gz — same fail-closed verification, no network needed.
Usage
Four frames for the same engine — pick the one the engagement asks for.
-
nice_scan hack example.com -R report.htmlFull engagement. Recon, probes, chaining and extraction in one run, with the verdict-ordered report at the end.
-
nice_scan scan example.com -iLive dashboard. Streaming findings and progress while the scan talks, for monitoring a longer sweep.
-
nice_scan exploit https://example.com --login --idor 1-100Targeted exploitation. Run selected modules against endpoints you already know.
--registeris refused without consent. -
nice_scan hack target.com --timeout 30s --destructiveConsented run. Time-boxed, and with the flag only the operator types when written permission covers state changes — command and shell modules included.
-
nice_scan scan staging.example.com --sarif results.sarif --fail-on-severity highPipeline gate. SARIF 2.1.0 feeds GitHub Code Scanning, GitLab and Azure DevOps; the severity flag fails the build. A composite GitHub Action ships at the repo root.
-
nice_scan scan app.example.com --openapi spec.yaml \ --identity-a alice@corp --identity-b bob@corp \ --session-a "Cookie: sid=A" --session-b "Cookie: sid=B"Grey-box differential. An OpenAPI spec guides probes past the SPA shell, and two sessions replay object URLs — a BOLA finding fires only on a proven identity marker, never on two 200s.
Trust the binary before you run it
Nothing here is marketing posture. Items that are not shipped are marked as such.
Checksums + signature
- Every release publishes
checksums.txt; GPG-signed when signing keys are configured. - The installer pins fingerprint
4CE4…A4DBfrom keyserver.ubuntu.com. - Mismatched key or unmatched checksum aborts, nothing executes.
sha256sum --check checksums.txt --ignore-missing
gpg --verify checksums.txt.sig checksums.txt
Provenance & SBOM
- GitHub build-provenance attestations are emitted per release — releases cut after 2026-10-24, nothing retroactive.
- Cosign keyless bundles arrive alongside the manifest.
- An SPDX SBOM ships in the release assets.
gh attestation verify nice_scan -R NICE-DEV226/nice-Scan
Audit the code instead
go installanchors strictly to a resolved tag.- Cloning a pinned tag removes every trust intermediary at once.
git clone --branch v0.3.7 https://github.com/NICE-DEV226/nice-Scan.git
Run only against assets you own or where you hold explicit written permission. nice_scan records consent for state-modifying actions; the operator still carries responsibility for where it points.